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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 On the relevance of poultry 
Throughout history, there has been an ideal that legal norms should exist before they are 
imposed on their subjects. With the evolvement of society, this ideal has become 
increasingly more present. It is one of predictability and by following this ideal, lawmakers 
have been able to better legitimize the imposition of their desired norms. For instance, 
basic formal demands to legislation, such as prohibition against retroactive legislation, 
derive from this ideal. However, while at what may be considered to be the peak of modern 
civilization, a strict understanding of this ideal may prove to obstruct the evolution of 
international law and the quest for a better world. International law has in the latter part of 
the 20th century developed from comprising a select amount of treaties into a vast dynamic 
area of law, concerning itself with a considerable amount of aspects that previously 
belonged to the realm of domestic law. A significant part of this development has been the 
achievements of the United Nations (UN), typically in relation to the introduction of 
novelties1 such as humanitarian law.  
 
It is principally with relation to international humanitarian law that the parallel to the 
chicken and the egg, as contained in this thesis’ title, shows its relevance. There has long 
been a logical belief that the egg existed before the chicken. This logic is based on the 
observation that every chicken is hatched out of an egg. From a domestic legal perspective, 
the egg could be considered as the formal demand to a norm’s legal foundation, while the 
chicken could serve as the imposition of the norm. By having knowledge of the egg, one 
would also have to recognize the possible existence of the chicken. Similarly, in penal law, 
                                                
1 Koskenniemi (2005), p. 210. 
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the same reasoning lies behind the principle of nulla poene sine lege2. The legal subjects of 
a State would have to recognize the possibility of punishment for breaking criminal norms 
that have been implemented into a State’s written laws. 
 
However, in international humanitarian law, it might prove difficult to define an egg 
(formal demand to norm). A common dilemma in newer and dynamic areas of international 
law, such as international humanitarian law, is that the speed with which substantive law 
develops supersedes that of formal legislative processes such as the making and 
amendment of treaties. It is noteworthy that in international humanitarian law, the 
substantive law has primarily been developed through the jurisprudence of international 
criminal tribunals. Until 2002 international criminal tribunals were impermanent tribunals 
set up to decide in cases of international criminal responsibility.3 Implicit in international 
criminal responsibility lies violations of international humanitarian law. Two claims have 
often been raised against the tribunals from the side of the Defence; it is argued that they 
lack both jurisdiction and substantive foundation.4 Both objections refer to that the formal 
demands to norms in international law are unfulfilled. In reference to our parallel, this 
could be rephrased to a claim that the chicken does not exist as there is no egg. 
 
Since it is evident5 that international criminal tribunals have enforced the norms of 
international humanitarian law, with questionable jurisdiction and material foundation to do 
so, we can consider the chicken’s existence without the egg. Yet, from a logical perspective 
there must be an egg. So the problem with acknowledging the egg’s existence may 
primarily lie in how to define it. In other words, an egg could be defined in different ways, 
depending on the viewer’s perspective and premises for defining it. Similarly, it will be 
                                                
2 Latin for No punishment without the existence of a law. 
3 A permanent international criminal court was founded July 1. 2002, by the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The Rome Statute is an international treaty and binds only States that formally express their 
consent to be bound by its provisions.   
4 E.g. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi and Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosovic.  
5 E.g. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi and Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic. 
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argued here that international law is regarded upon and argued from several different 
perspectives. For instance, a professor of political science would define international law 
and its sources based on different premises than a professor of law. In relation to 
international humanitarian law, the formal demands to norms may be weaker due to a 
change in perspective on how to view the different sources that comprise international law.  
 
According to Martti Koskenniemi, a professor of international law, a study of the 
argumentative practice in international law reveals that there are four general perspectives 
from which to perceive international law: The rule-approach, the policy-approach, the 
skeptical position and the idealist position. His claim is found in his treatise “From 
Apology to Utopia”6, which will be introduced in detail below.  These four general 
perspectives are referred to as modernist doctrines.7 One of these doctrines, the idealist 
position, is claimed to be representative of the argumentative practice in international 
humanitarian law.8 If this is the case, one will have a perspective from which to understand 
the structuring of an international humanitarian argument. 
 
My aim with this thesis is to prove whether or not the idealist position’s perspective on 
international law corresponds with the argumentative practice in international 
humanitarian law, or in reference to our parallel: to understand where the chicken comes 
from. 
1.2 On choice of sources 
My thesis is inspired by Koskenniemi’s “From Apology to Utopia”9. Originally written in 
1989, and reissued in 2005 with a new epilogue, “From Apology to Utopia” has received 
status as an epic of international legal literature10 due to its thorough evaluation of 
                                                
6 Koskenniemi (2005). 
7 Koskenniemi (2005), p. 182. 
8 Koskenniemi (2005), p. 210. 
9 Koskenniemi (2005).  
10 E.g. German Law Journal No. 12 (1 December 2006). 
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international law and what he refers to as modernist doctrines. Modernist doctrines are 
alternative positions from which to understand international law. The author himself claims 
to represent a postmodernist approach to international law. This implies deconstructing the 
modernist doctrines through analysis, illustrating the inconsistency of modernist 
argumentation and relativity of international law. While his postmodernist approach shall 
not be pursued in this essay, his findings in “From Apology to Utopia” will prove valuable 
in order to understand the content of the different modernist doctrines generally and the 
idealist position in particular.  
 
Furthermore, my method for analyzing the chosen data draws inspiration from 
Koskenniemi. By a koskenniemian reading of the chosen data, as contained in this thesis’ 
title, I refer to emphasizing on argumentative structures rather than substantive content. 
 
My choice of data is a significant decision by the International War Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslav Republic [ICTY], Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic [Tadic case].11 Decided in 1995, 
the Tadic case concerned the determination of international criminal responsibility of 
Dusko Tadic for crimes he allegedly committed in the Prijedor region of Bosnia-
Herzegovine between May and August 1992. Tadic was accused of rape, unlawful killing, 
torture and cruel treatment.12 The case has been chosen since it is regarded as the most 
principled decision delivered by the ICTY. The since the Tadic case was the first fully 
contended case before the ICTY. Notwithstanding that international criminal courts do not 
follow the binding force of precedent, the Tadic decision is still referred to by the ICTY 
and other international criminal courts, such as the ICTR, when opposed by similar 
contentions as in the Tadic case13. This implies that the arguments made by ICTY in the 
Tadic case are acknowledged in later decisions by the ICTY and other international 
criminal courts. As international humanitarian law is primarily practiced authoritatively 
through the decisions of international criminal courts, this acknowledgement suggests, it is 
                                                
11 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1). 
12 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, First Amended Indictment 
13 E.g. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kanyabashi. 
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asserted here, that argumentative structures found in the Tadic case will be identifiable with 
and common within international humanitarian law. Thus, these structures will be typical to 
international humanitarian law and will be tried against my four hypotheses. By typical 
structures, I refer to argumentative structures that generally are identifiable within one area 
of law. By structures, I refer to how and on which premises an argument is built up; and by 
an argument, I refer to a set of structures that result in a final position. 
 
1.3 On the structure of the present thesis 
The dissertation is divided into three main parts. The first chapter will present general traits 
of an international humanitarian argument, as found in an analysis of Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic.14 This will be a presentation of data. The second chapter will consist of a 
presentation of four modern doctrines on how to perceive international law and their 
general traits. This will be a presentation of four different hypotheses. The general traits of 
an international humanitarian argument (data) will, in the third chapter, be compared with 
the general traits of the four doctrines (hypothesis). On the basis of this comparison, I will 
conclude on whether the idealist doctrine dominates the application of international 
humanitarian law. 
 
As will be further explained under section 1.4, my dissertation follows a method much 
inspired by the method of natural sciences. By following this method, I am dependent on 
operating with comparable data and hypotheses. In order to achieve this, both data and 
hypothesis are expressed as mathematically as possible. This is achieved by operating with 
general traits.  Each general trait has a certain recognizable content. Both data and 
hypothesis are expressed by a list of general traits. These lists will follow the presentation 
of data (section 2.7) and the presentation of each hypothesis (sections 3.1.2.2, 3.1.3.2, 
3.1.4.2 and 3.1.5.2), and will serve as basis for comparison in section 4 thus providing the 
dissertation with a transparent structure. 
                                                
14 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic. 
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1.4 On method 
In choosing a method, focus has been kept on creating a method that best allows me to 
outline structural patterns of international humanitarian argumentation and to link these 
with an international legal doctrine. With this focus, I have found it useful to apply a 
method much inspired by the methods used in natural sciences. In more specific terms, I 
have based my method on basic induction and deduction. By induction, I refer to 
generalizing international humanitarian argumentative traits from the practice of 
international criminal tribunals.15 Deduction refers to evaluating my thesis by comparing 
hypothesis with data.16  
 
By choosing this method, an approach transpires that bears similarity to a traditional legal 
method, where a rule is found through induction (extracting a rule from different sources) 
and applied by deduction (the rule is compared on the facts of a situation). The traditional 
legal method in this respect shares considerable aspects with the method of natural 
sciences, which in its essence is pure math. This is due to the fact that all sciences are 
attempts to analyze and give order to the perceived world, e.g. in biology with focus on all 
living organisms and in law with focus on the norms that regulate society. 
 
When comparing the argumentative structures of the doctrines with those found in the 
analysis, it might prove difficult to find a complete match. This is a common problem 
within natural sciences. This problem is solved by awareness of potential weaknesses 
connected to experiments (where a thesis is either proved or abandoned) and an 
acknowledgement of the minor probability of a 100 percent match between thesis and data. 
Instead it is commonly operated with a minimal demand to the probability of the thesis 
being correct.  The probability is calculated by comparing the desired match with the actual 
match and the minimal demand to probability increases with the amount of data gathered. 
                                                
15 "induction." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 12 Nov. 2008  
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9042354>. 
16  "deduction." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 12 Nov. 2008  
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9029720>. 
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My thesis is likely to meet similar obstacles. I do not expect to find a 100 percent match 
between the general structural traits extracted from the different doctrines and the traits 
found in the analysis. First of all, by extracting general structural traits from the different 
modern doctrines, I will exclude other relevant structures that can be found in the analysis. 
Furthermore, I do not expect to be able to see all relevant structures in the material 
analyzed. This will be taken into consideration in my conclusion together with showing 
awareness of the limited amount of data gathered. A minor probability of my thesis being 
correct will not necessarily disprove my thesis. It may just as well be the result of 
inaccuracy of or a limited set of data.  
 
In the legal sciences, it is not usual to operate with a rate of probability in the same manner 
as is seen in the natural sciences. Instead, one chooses the understanding that is or appears 
to be most reasonable. Reasonableness is a relative concept, and not easy to convert into 
figures. However, in most cases, a reasonable understanding of arguments de lege lata 
could be converted into a probability that exceeds 50 percent. This must be seen in relation 
to the need of order in law. Natural sciences operate with minimum 5 percent demand to 
probability. Considering the weaknesses connected with generalizing argumentative 
structures, it seems too rigid to operate with a minimal demand of 50 percent. In this 
relation, I find that the bar to keep my thesis should be placed to the lower minimal demand 
of 5 percent, whilst operating with a minimal demand of 50 percent to prove my thesis. 
These preliminary observations on method will prove more understandable as the thesis 
unfolds. 
  
1.5 On my position 
I aim to keep an objective position throughout the essay. To be more specific, I will try to 
avoid judging the correctness of the different doctrines or the argumentation of the ICTY. 
Such judgment is irrelevant when considering that my aim with the thesis is to prove the 
relevance of an idealist doctrine in international humanitarian law. However, it should be 
emphasized that no position is truly objective. I acknowledge that my choice of sources and 
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my analysis of the Tadic case will somehow be influenced by a variety of factors, including 
my background from domestic Norwegian law. My background leads me to consider my 
initial position to international law as close to the rule-approach. Similarly, it also makes 
me familiar with many of the thoughts and ideas behind the idealist position.    
 
 
2 General traits of an international humanitarian argument 
By making use of a koskenniemian17 analysis of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, I have 
identified six general traits of an international humanitarian argument.  In the following, 
each acclaimed argumentative trait will be presented with reference to my findings from 
the analysis. A final summary of the general traits will serve as comparative data to the 
different hypothesis that will follow in chapter three. 
 
2.1 Operating with a wide scope of international legal sources 
2.1.1 Claim 
The main substantive legal question that arose in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic was a question 
of jurisdiction.18 The tribunal [the ICTY] had been given jurisdiction through Statutes given 
by the UN Security Council. It was primarily Articles 2 and 3 of the Statutes that regulated 
the question of jurisdiction, and thus constituted the substantive law on the basis of which 
the tribunal had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to decide the substance of the 
dispute.19 The discussion on Article 2 concerned the tribunal’s “power to prosecute 
persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva 
                                                
17 See section 1.2. 
18 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 8. 
19 See Appendix A to view the content of Article 2 and 3 of the Statute. 
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Conventions”.20 The substantive legal question regarding Article 2 was whether the 
reference to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions restricted the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
to international armed conflicts.21 With regards to Article 3, the discussion concerned the 
tribunal’s “power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war”.22 This 
discussion was concentrated on the substantive legal question of whether the laws or 
customs of war only applied in international armed conflicts.23  
 
One would assume, while considering the substantive questions at hand, that the tribunal 
gave relevance to a restricted amount of sources. However, the tribunal gave a wide range 
of sources relevance in its interpretation of Articles 2 and 3. That the tribunal in Prosecutor 
v. Dusko Tadic gave relevance to such a variety of sources, leads me to the following 
claim: The tribunal regarded international law to have a wide substantive scope.   
2.1.2 Findings supporting the claim 
In its interpretation of Article 2 of the ICTY statute, the tribunal undertook both a 
contextual and a teleological interpretation of the provision’s literal content.24 In addition to 
the Statute itself, statements by the UN Security Council on the establishment of the ICTY 
constituted the main legal sources. However, the tribunal gave the following other sources 
relevance in its argumentation: An Amicus Curiae Brief submitted by the U.S.A., 
indications in the provisions of the German Military Manual, the fact that the conflicting 
parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina chose to implement the law of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions on limiting the barbarity of war into their conflict and a decision by the 
Danish High Court.25  
 
                                                
20 ICTY Statutes, Article 2 
21 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 65 
22 ICTY Statutes, Article 3 
23 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 65 
24 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premises 71-85. 
25 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 83. 
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The Statute and statements by the Security Council also constituted the main sources in the 
tribunal’s reading of Article 3. However, in order to further strengthen its argument that it 
indeed had jurisdiction to decide in the case, the tribunal additionally emphasized 
statements from specific members of the Security Council to support their interpretation.26 
This was done to illustrate that the tribunal’s understanding of Article 3 was “borne out by 
the debates in the Security Council that followed the adoption of the resolution establishing 
the International Tribunal”.27 Implicitly, the statements were used to prove that the 
tribunal’s understanding of Article 3 was in harmony with the opinion of the States that 
gave the tribunal its statutes. That the declarations were given decisive weight, is well 
illustrated by the following statement from the tribunal: “Since no delegate contested these 
declarations, they can be regarded as providing an authoritative interpretation of Article 3 
to the effect that its scope is much broader than the enumerated violations of Hague 
law”.28  
 
In its reading of Article 2 as well as Article 3, the tribunal gives relevance to a wide range 
of sources. 
 
2.2 Applying resolving generalities 
2.2.1 Claim 
In its essence, the structuring of argumentation in the Tadic case has one only purpose; to 
promote the application of resolving generalities. The structuring of argumentation follows 
one pattern: A new understanding is interpreted into traditional texts by differentiating 
between different aspects of the text and expressing doubt about its content, only to 
perceive it in the light of more abstract sources and find the text to have an abstract content. 
                                                
26 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 88. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
 11 
That the tribunal follows this argumentative pattern, leads me to the following claim: The 
tribunal applies resolving generalities. 
 
In order to prove this, a presentation of the structuring of argumentation in Prosecutor v. 
Dusko Tadic will follow below. 
2.2.2 Findings supporting the claim 
 
The tribunal started its literal interpretation of Article 2 of the Statute by creating doubt 
about its literal understanding.29 This was done by differentiation, i.e., by introducing two 
possible understandings of the provision, one giving the tribunal wide jurisdiction [Ax] and 
another giving it narrow jurisdiction [Ay].30 The literal doubt enabled the tribunal to seek 
further guidance about the understanding of Article 2 in other sources.31 
 
The tribunal found further guidance first by examining the “object and purpose” of the 
Statute, emphasizing the political motives for its enactment.32 In this way, the tribunal 
found support for the most ideal of the two possible literal understandings of Article 2 in 
terms of achieving wide jurisdiction (Ax).33 
 
By examining the “object and purpose” behind the Statute, the tribunal introduced 
arguments against choosing an understanding of Article 2 that gave the Tribunal narrow 
jurisdiction (Ay). The first argument was based on the difficulty of applying Ay on the 
factual situation, which the tribunal described as chaotic.34 The second argument was based 
on that the legislative organ that enacted the Statutes did not specify how Article 2 should 
                                                
29 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 71. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 72 onwards. 
32 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premises 72-78. 
33 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 78. 
34 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 73. 
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be understood.35 Passivity was emphasized as support for the latter argument.36 Another 
argument opposing Ay was dubbed as “logical” and presented Ay as a reductio ad 
absurdum:37 A type of logical argument where one assumes a claim for the sake of 
argument and derives an absurd or ridiculous outcome, and then concludes that the original 
claim must have been wrong as it led to an absurd result.38 The presentation of Ay as 
reductio ad absurdum was based on other premises than what was advocated by the 
counsel for Mr. Tadic’s Defence.39 
 
The deductio ad absurdum was, it might be said, used as a diversion, and it was followed 
by a temporary conclusion on the preference of Ax.40 The tribunal thus diverted attention 
from the poor substantive basis for Ax. 
 
Hence, the Tribunal found a disharmony between Ay and its findings in the other sources.41 
This lead the Tribunal to undertake a “logical and systematic” interpretation of the 
Statute.42 
 
In its “logical and systematic” interpretation of Article 2, the Tribunal found that Ay is 
“widely contended” as a correct understanding of the Geneva Conventions.43 Similarly, the 
tribunal emphasized that the content of the Geneva Conventions “might appear 
ambiguous” and “be open for some debate”.44 Differentiation is also here used as a tool of 
                                                
35 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 74. 
36 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 75. 
37 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 76. 
38 "reductio ad absurdum." Encyclopædia Britannica. 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 12 Nov. 2008  
<http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9062992>. 
39 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 65. 
40 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 77. 
41 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 78. 
42 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 79 onwards. 
43 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 79. 
44 Ibid. 
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inserting an understanding favorable to the tribunal, while at the same time recognizing 
arguments de lege lata. By differentiating between the Geneva Conventions’ regulation of 
jurisdiction and substantive law, the tribunal liberated the question of jurisdiction from the 
Geneva Conventions.45 This lead the tribunal to introduce a third possible understanding of 
Article 2, Az, which shares Ay’s view on the substantive law and Ax’s view on 
jurisdiction.46 However, a conclusion on the preference of Az is followed by an obiter 
dictum, strongly favouring Ax.47 The obiter dictum signalizes future change in the 
substantive law, a change introduced already later in the same decision, under the tribunal’s 
interpretation of Article 3. 
 
The tribunal’s understanding of Article 3 can be seen as following the same pattern as its 
decision on how Article 2 should be interpreted.  
 
By arguing that Article 3 was restricted to international conflicts [By], the counsel for the 
Defence structured his argument in a similar fashion as was done with relation to Article 
2.48 However, the tribunal rejected By as being “an unnecessary narrow reading of the 
Statute” that did not deserve any “closer scrutiny”.49 It was not even considered, as Ay was 
under Article 2. That By was not considered must be seen in relation to the tribunal 
liberating the question of jurisdiction from the Geneva Conventions under Article 2.50 By 
liberating the question of jurisdiction from the Geneva Conventions, the tribunal was no 
longer bound by the Geneva Conventions’ jurisdictional restriction to international armed 
conflicts. 
 
                                                
45 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premises 80-82. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 83. 
48 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 86. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premises 80-82. 
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Instead, the tribunal concentrated on arguments championing an interpretation similar to Ax 
under Article 2. In its discussion under Article 3, the tribunal achieved a very wide literal 
interpretation of Article 3 [Bx], through a series of differentiations.51 Bx implies jurisdiction 
over all breaches of international humanitarian law, and relates in content to the obiter 
dictum under Article 2.52 
 
The series of differentiations commence in the tribunal’s reading of Article 3 as a general 
clause concerning “violations of laws and customs of war”, which is not restricted to the 
listings of offences in its text.53 Furthermore, “violations of laws and customs of war” was 
interpreted to refer to the traditional concept of “armed conflicts” in the Geneva 
Conventions and to the concept of “international armed conflict” in the Hague 
Conventions.54 The latter was interpreted into the contemporary concept of “international 
humanitarian law”.55 This enabled the tribunal to conclude that it had jurisdiction over all 
breaches against international humanitarian law and to emphasize the opinions related to 
the obiter dictum. In this way, an opinion was labeled both as de lege ferenda and de lege 
lata in the same decision. It also enabled the tribunal to enforce norms from a very wide 
substantive scope. 
 
A conclusion on the preference of Bx is here defended as “borne out of the debates of the 
Security Council”56, based on the purpose of the tribunal and on the political opinion of the 
Western powers.57 The wide conclusion was further defended as being limited, as it was 
limited to cover only “serious violations” and to the jurisdiction of the other provisions of 
the Statute.58 
                                                
51 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 87. 
52 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 83. 
53 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 87. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 88. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 90. 
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By following this complex argumentative structure, the tribunal enabled itself to apply 
resolving generalities.  
 
2.3 Avoiding clear theorizing 
2.3.1 Claim 
In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the tribunal did not consider alternative perceptions of the 
substantive law in detail. In fact, opposing the tribunal’s own reading were either bluntly 
dismissed or ridiculed as a “reductio ad absurdum” argument. By doing this, it can be 
claimed that the tribunal avoided clear theorizing. By avoiding clear theorizing, I refer to a 
superficial type of argumentation that lacks profound theorizing on the substantive legal 
question at hand.     
 
In the following, examples of how the tribunal avoided clear theorizing will be given. 
2.3.2 Findings supporting the claim 
In premise 76 of the decision the tribunal, while interpreting Article 2 of the Statute, 
dismissed an argument based on a claim that silence from the Security Council implies that 
the matter has not been decided on. This done by labeling it as an “reductio ad absurdum” 
argument.59 60 
 
The tribunal constructed the “reductio ad absurdum” argument by assuming a situation 
where the conflict was classified as international by the Security Council and where only 
the civilians of one of the conflicting parties were considered to belong to a new state.61 
                                                
59 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 76. 
60 See section 2.2 for definition 
61 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 76. 
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The absurd outcome would thereby be a situation where only one group of civilians was 
protected by the Geneva Conventions.62  
 
From an analytical point of view, this can be regarded as a misunderstanding of both the 
argument made by the Defence and that of the Prosecutor.63 In this way, the argument is 
based on false premises. The assumed argument was to be based either on a situation where 
the conflict was deemed internal or a situation where it was classified as international with 
a similar recognition of new nationalities for the respective civilians.64 Had the argument 
been based on formally correct premises, it could not be seen as “reductio ad absurdum”. 
 
By illustrating the argument of the counsel for the Defence in this fashion, the tribunal 
gives the impression of theorizing. However, when given closer scrutiny, the presentation 
“reductio ad absurdum” is clearly a rhetorical move made use of to avoid clear theorizing 
on the matter. 
 
In its interpretation of Article 3 of the Statute, the tribunal avoided clear theorizing in a 
different manner; by simply rejecting the Defence’s argument. While the argument is more 
thoroughly investigated with regard to Article 2 (“reductio ad absurdum”), the tribunal 
commences its examination of Article 3 by rejecting it without any further reasoning.65 
 
By following a similar line of argumentation as under Article 2, the counsel for the 
Defence continued to argue from a position bearing similarity to what will later be 
presented as the rule-approach to international law. The argument of the Defence was thus 
summarized by the tribunal: “Appellant argues that the Hague Regulations were adopted 
to regulate interstate armed conflict, while the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is in casu 
an internal armed conflict; therefore, to the extent that the jurisdiction of the International 
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64 Ibid. 
65 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, premise 86. 
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Tribunal under Article 3 is based on the Hague Regulations, it lacks jurisdiction under 
Article 3 to adjudicate alleged violations in the former Yugoslavia.”66  
 
While bearing in mind that the counsel for the Defence more or less succeeded with this 
approach in relation to Article 2, it comes as a surprise that a similar approach here is 
rejected in one sentence as “based on an unnecessarily narrow reading of the Statute” that 
“does not bear close scrutiny.”67 It illustrates, in my view, that the tribunal followed a 
different approach to international law than the counsel for the Defence.  
 
2.4 Perceiving that law should be understood as a reflection of society 
2.4.1 Claim 
To perceive that law should be understood as a reflection of society is an ideal known from 
the age of enlightenment.68 Three aspects of the tribunal’s argumentation give grounds to 
claim that it perceives that international law should reflect the opinion of the international 
society: It applies a wide range of sources, it emphasizes the opinion of the members of the 
UN Security Council and it adapts the substantive law to changes of opinion within the 
international society through an obiter dictum. 
2.4.2 Findings supporting the claim 
The application of a wide range of sources can be understood to correspond with an ideal 
where law should reflect society; the wider range of sources given relevance the more 
representative the law is of international society.  
 
Another aspect that promotes the notion that the tribunal holds law’s reflection of society 
as an ideal, is the tribunal’s emphasis on the opinion of the members of the Security 
Council. Not only is the “will” of the Security Council given relevance. Similarly, the 
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opinion of its respective members is regarded as relevant for the tribunal.69 This can be 
regarded as giving relevance to the opinion of members of the international society. 
Implicitly, this can be understood as a reference to that the content of the law should reflect 
the opinions of its subjects. 
 
The mentioned notion is confirmed when a basis for change in the substantive law is 
introduced via an obiter dictum.70 This shows that the content of the substantive law is 
attempted changed through jurisprudential decisions, and can be understood as a will to 
adapt the material law to the development in the international society. Thus, one can 
conclude that the tribunal emphasized that the content of the law should reflect the opinion 
of the international society. 
2.5 Emphasizing formal legal sources 
2.5.1 Claim 
Each conclusion in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic is based on a literal interpretation of the 
Statute. In other words, the tribunal bases its decision on a source of formal validity. There 
are grounds to say that the Statute is interpreted so wide that it must be regarded as a 
disguise for other sources of less formal validity. Without considering such a claim, it 
nonetheless proves that the tribunal emphasized formal legal sources. 
 
This perception is further strengthened when regarding the tribunal’s structuring of its 
argumentation. In the decision, the structural patterns of argumentation serve another 
purpose, namely to include content from formally less valid sources into a source of higher 
formal validity. This is the same pattern as described under 2.2. To support this claim, I 
will give a presentation on how the tribunal commences its discussion on the substantive 
law and on how the formal validity of the main sources is emphasized in its conclusion.    
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2.5.2 Findings supporting the claim 
The tribunal’s discussion on Article 2 begins with a literal interpretation of the Statute.71 
The tribunal focuses on a contextual reading of the Statute, since a literal reading of the 
provision in Article 2 by itself would prove fruitless in relation to achieving jurisdiction72. 
This is done by comparing the content of Article 2 to that of Article 3. From this 
comparison, the tribunal draws the conclusion that “the absence of a similar provision in 
Article 3 might suggest that Article 3 applies only to one class of the conflict rather than 
both of them.”73 The tribunal consequently finds that it “will therefore consider the object 
and purpose behind the enactment of the Statute.”74 This is chosen “In order better to 
ascertain the meaning and scope of these provisions.”75  
 
The comparison described above can be understood as a means of differentiating the two 
provisions. Furthermore, by creating doubt of the reading of the two provisions, the 
tribunal finds a reason to find inspiration in abstract thoughts and ideas. These abstract 
thoughts and ideas are later interpreted into the content of Article 2 through an obiter 
dictum as arguments de lege ferenda.76 
 
However, the tribunal concludes that Article 2 of the Statute and its reference to “protected 
persons or property” is understood to be restricted only to international conflicts. It states 
that the tribunal’s “interpretation of Article 2 is the only one warranted by the text of the 
Statute and the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions, as well as by a logical 
construction of their interplay as dictated by Article 2.”77 The conclusion is based solely on 
the sources of higher formal validity. 
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As mentioned under 2.2, the narrow reading of Article 2 serves a purpose: To interpret 
Article 3 into being a general clause. 
  
The tribunal also begins its discussion on Article 3 with a literal interpretation.78 
Inconsistent with its previous holding in the decision, the tribunal starts its interpretation 
with stating what the interpretation will result in: “A literal interpretation of Article 3 
shows that: (i) it refers to a broad category of offences, namely all “violations of the laws 
or customs of war”; and (ii) the enumeration of some of these violations provided in Article 
3 is merely illustrative, not exhaustive.”79 This signals that the tribunal reads Article 3 to 
have a wide content. 
 
Similar to its interpretation of Article 2, the tribunal stresses the importance of a contextual 
reading of the Statute, as “one must take account of the context of the Statute as a 
whole”.80 In constructing its conclusion, the tribunal emphasizes that the “purpose and 
tasks” of the tribunal refers to “”serious violations” of international humanitarian law”81. 
Furthermore, it is found “appropriate to take the expression “violations of the laws or 
customs of war” to cover serious violations of international humanitarian law.”82 The 
jurisdictional limitation to “serious violations” must be seen as a minor restriction to the 
conclusion from their argumentation. The tribunal thus harmonizes the content of other 
sources with the provision’s written content before stating its conclusion. 
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The tribunal thus concludes on a rather wide reading of Article 3 in that “it can be held that 
Article 3 is a general clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not falling under 
Article 2”.83  
 
In other words, with the limitation to “serious violations”, the tribunal inserts into Article 3 
every aspect of international humanitarian law except for what followed a very narrow 
interpretation of Article 2. In this way, Article 3 functions as a formal disguise for all other 
sources of international humanitarian law. 
  
2.6 A norm’s absolute binding force is implicit  
2.6.1 Claim 
To take a norm’s absolute binding force for granted is an argumentative trait closely linked, 
in my view, to the trait of avoiding clear theorizing. To question a norm’s binding force 
leads to a discussion on normative value.84 In Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, the normative 
value of international humanitarian norms is not discussed. This can be understood to mean 
that the tribunal regards international humanitarian norms’ absolute binding force to be 
implicit.  
2.6.2 Findings supporting the claim 
It should be noted that the substantive question in the Tadic case concerned jurisdiction. 
The question of jurisdiction does not concern a norm’s normative value, but rather whether 
there are grounds to enforce norms. However, in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, international 
humanitarian norms are enforced without discussing their normative value. This suggests 
that the ICTY did not question the normative value of international humanitarian norms. 
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2.7 Summary/Data 
Six general traits of an international humanitarian argument can be extracted on the basis of 
sections 2.1 to 2.6. They will serve as data in a comparison with the different hypotheses 
that follow in section 3. The set of data contains short descriptions of each general trait 
referring to its content.  
 
The data is as follows:  
-Operating with a wide scope of international legal sources. 
-Applying resolving generalities. 
-Avoiding clear theorizing. 
-Emphasizing that law should reflect the international society. 
-Emphasizing formal legal sources. 
-A norm’s absolute binding force is implicit. 
3 Modern doctrines of international law 
 
3.1 Doctrines 
When inducing a norm from the vast amount of sources in international law85, a jurist is 
faced with primarily two challenges: The first being the question of which sources that are 
relevant. The second question concerns how much weight each source shall be given when 
harmonizing the content of the relevant sources. In “From Apology to Utopia”, Martti 
Koskenniemi has rephrased these two questions into being a question of limiting 
international laws material scope and a question of the normative value of a source.86 
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In the following, four different approaches to solve these questions will be presented. Each 
approach is called a doctrine. Each doctrine presents different premises for considering the 
material scope of international law and the normative value of a source. The four doctrines 
must not be understood as being a fixed and permanent classification on how international 
lawyers argue, but are merely meant to demonstrate “typical ways of trying to construct 
better doctrines by lawyers who have been relatively “theoretical” and consistent.”87  
 
My aim with this part of the thesis is to illustrate how the four doctrines represent different 
perspectives on how to understand the content of international law. Furthermore, I attempt 
to generalize certain traits of how an argument would be structured from the different 
perspectives. The presented traits will serve as four alternative hypotheses on how to 
structure a “typical”88 international humanitarian argument.       
3.1.1 Background for determining modern doctrines and their general traits 
Before further explaining the content of the four doctrines, viewing the doctrines from a 
historical background could prove valuable in order to understand why there is a need to 
“construct better doctrines”.89 International law has always been perceived differently. 
While some lawyers have deducted norms from natural laws, others have emphasized State 
sovereignty and remained focused on international law’s obligatory nature. With the 
exception of early discourses on natural laws, international law was in essence for a long 
time primarily a medium for Kings and Emperors to legitimize the righteousness of their 
actions.90 However, at the beginning of the 20th century and in correspondence with an 
increasingly united world, a greater need for regulations amongst States arose. With this 
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came a serious demand for professional international lawyers and multilateral treaties. 
International law had turned professional, as stated by Koskenniemi.91 
 
Despite great efforts in diplomacy, the professionalists did not manage to prevent two 
devastating world wars. This lead to a lack of confidence in international law and a crisis 
within the international legal community. To some extent this crisis still exists. The failure 
of professionalism inspired a new school of international lawyers, aiming to solve the crisis 
in international law. A common trait to this new school of lawyers is that they try to 
distance themselves from the weaknesses connected with professionalism. The main 
criticism against professionalism was, according to Koskenniemi, that the professionalist 
way of regarding international law was either apologetic or utopian92. The criticism of 
being apologetic was primarily raised against professionalists’ emphasis on State 
sovereignty, while the label utopian was connected to their beliefs in natural laws, 
arbitration and conferences on keeping the peace.93 Modernists seek, in Koskenniemi’s 
view, to use this critique and, through differentiation, create a new doctrine containing 
neither.94 
 
As a consequence, international lawyers try to avoid being labeled as “apologist” or 
“utopian”. However; “[n]o position, argument or doctrine is by itself utopian or apologist. 
These characterizations relate to a position only as a result of interpretation, projection 
from an opposing perspective – another view about what it is for an argument to be 
“subjective” or “objective”.95 In other words, the fear of being labeled may prove hard to 
eliminate, since the labeled terms are used in a superficial manner and depend on the object 
of criticism as well as the eye of the beholder. This new wave in international law is 
characterized as modernist. .  
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When categorizing the modernist doctrines, Koskenniemi emphasizes how the 
concreteness and normativity of international law is regarded according to each typical 
perspective. Furthermore, he has found that the modernists differentiated themselves from 
professionalism through assuming a difference between a descending and an ascending 
argument.96 An argument based on natural laws is an example of a descending structure 
and implies a risk of utopian critique. On the other hand, an argument based on a strict 
view on State sovereignty, is an example of an ascending structure and might give basis for 
apologist criticism.97 As a summary: “Each dispute involves, in one way or another, the 
opposition between a descending and an ascending way to argue about order and 
obligation and varying emphasis on the ideas of normativity and concreteness.”98 
 
Thus, typical structures of argumentation by international lawyers are categorized into four 
versions of modernist doctrines: the rule-approach, the policy-approach, the skeptical 
position and the idealist position. These approaches will now be dealt with in more detail. 
3.1.2 The rule-approach/ Hypothesis I 
3.1.2.1 Presentation of the rule-approach 
By championing the professionalists emphasis on State sovereignty, and at the same time 
abandoning their more abstract ideas such as natural laws, a typical rule-approach lawyer 
conceives their view of international law by focusing on its obligatory nature.  
 
A rule-approach implies the following of a perspective inspired by domestic law. It 
emphasizes the formality of legal sources and on the functioning of law-creating processes. 
From this perspective, objectivity is reached through induction. This is in contrast to 
                                                
96 Koskenniemi (2005), p. 170-171. 
97 Koskenniemi (2005), p. 168. 
98 Ibid. 
 26 
deductivism and eclectism, as “[l]aw is created by legal subjects – not by deductions from 
abstract principles.”99  
 
Through this perspective, international law can be perceived as normatively strong and 
binding. The rule-approach draws a distinction between law and politics and stresses the 
need for order and predictability in international law. A norm is valid as law or arguments 
de lege lata only if it binds as a standard. Other aspects of State behaviour are viewed as de 
lege ferenda arguments or political opinions.100 
 
Yet, the rule-approach enables only a fraction of State behaviour to be revealed.101 In its 
essence, the rule-approach represents a perspective from which law is normatively strong, 
but restricted in scope. 
3.1.2.2 General traits of a rule-approach argument/Hypothesis I 
All the general traits of a doctrine compose a hypothesis, containing short descriptions 
related to the content of each general trait. The hypothesis will be compared with the data 
from section 2.7 in section 4. 
 
Hypothesis I has the following content: 
-Emphasis on a norm’s formal legal basis 
-Inductive argumentation 
-Emphasis on State sovereignty and order in the international law-creating process 
3.1.3 The policy-approach/ Hypothesis II 
3.1.3.1 Presentation of the policy-approach 
A common factor for both the rule-approach and the policy-approach is that their 
perspectives are based on premises deriving from social sciences. However, while the rule-
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approach extracts its premises from legal science, the policy-approach receives its premises 
from political science. A distinction between the two is based on the fact that each science 
has its own “conceptual schemes through which isolated facts of behavior are linked 
together and given meaning.”102 Drawing his inspiration from “conceptual schemes” of 
political science, an international lawyer, arguing from a policy-approach, would downplay 
traditional formal demands to law in order to “[see] law in every “process””.103 
 
A main point of criticism, that the followers of the rule-approach make against the policy-
approach, is that it confuses the relationship between law and politics in “an apologist 
manner”, which is “useful only to legitimize de facto situations”.104On the contrary, a 
critique that a policy-approach lawyer can make against the rule-approach is that their strict 
evaluation of State behaviour is far from the reality of how States actually behave, giving 
international law an “abstract and unreal binding force”.105 It is thus not based on reality 
and is therefore utopian. 
 
According to the policy-approach, international law’s normative value varies and relates to 
the factual authoritativeness of legal decision. Authoritative decision-making takes and has 
relevance at all levels of international conduct. This gives international law a very wide 
scope.106 
 
Moreover, a premise for the policy-approach argument is that contemporary normative 
processes have shifted “from formal, legally binding accords into other forms of 
commitment”.107 In order to better evaluate international law, focus is therefore 
concentrated on the degree of effective control that can be associated with every norm. 
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However, due to “the lack of common values and the individualized nature of situations in 
international life”108, it is given that the degree of effective control will vary. 
 
Hence, the policy-approach lawyer’s claim to objectivity is based on scientific 
assumptions, more specifically on observable decision-making, authority and 
effectiveness.109 Ironically, by following the policy-approach lawyer’s method of proving 
international law’s independence from politics, one will simultaneously prove the relevance 
of politics.110 
3.1.3.2 General traits of a policy-approach argument/Hypothesis II 
Hypothesis II has the following content: 
-Objectivity is based on assumptions from political sciences 
-Focus on observable decision-making, authority and effectiveness 
-International law has an individualized nature 
-A rule’s formal validity is unimportant 
3.1.4 The skeptical position/ Hypothesis III 
3.1.4.1 Presentation of the skeptical position 
The skeptical position is a different approach, which has mostly been developed among 
political scientists. Even though the skeptical position shares the same view on 
international law’s restricted material scope as the rule-approach, an international lawyer 
advocating from the former position would nonetheless also be skeptical towards 
international law’s binding force. Hence, from this perspective, international law can be 
perceived as neither having a wide material scope nor having a strong normative character. 
In essence, this implies a denouncement of international law as a legal discipline.111 
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Even though the skeptical position agrees with the normative ideal, advocated by the rule-
approach, that there should be a clear distinction between law and politics, a skeptic is 
doubtful about the possibilities of its international realization. They believe that this is due 
to the fact that international law has neither a uniform nor an absolute binding nature.112 
 
Another factor that distances the skeptical position from the previous doctrines lies in their 
claim that other lawyers, especially rule-approach lawyers, disregard sociological and 
ethical factors as vital elements when defining an international legal study. 113  By 
disregarding these factors, the other lawyers would fail in understanding the true nature of 
international law. For instance, rule-approach lawyers believe that the concept of sanctions 
depends on the existence of a rule, while skeptical position lawyers argue that sanctions’ 
dependence on a rule is irrelevant. Instead, from a sociological perspective, they focus on 
the likelihood of a sanction following the breaking of a norm, thus, regarding sanctions 
only as an observable fact. Furthermore, a skeptic would also claim that a rule’s binding 
force is relative to the political context of each situation. 114  This is based on the 
observation that the sociological contexts of international rules are highly individualized, 
and depends on common interests or balance of power to support it.115 From this 
perspective, a rule has no reality outside of this context. 
3.1.4.2 General traits of an argument from the skeptical position/Hypothesis III 
Hypothesis III has the following content: 
-International law has neither a wide material scope, nor a strong normative 
character 
-International law has neither a uniform, nor an absolute binding nature 
-A rule’s normative value is individual and varies with the specific social context of 
each situation 
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-Sanctions are relative to political context 
3.1.5 The idealist position/ Hypothesis IV 
3.1.5.1 Presentation of the idealist position 
The idealist lawyers advocate perhaps a more cheerful position towards international law. 
A Leitmotif116 behind the idealist position is to combine the virtues of both the rule- and 
policy-approach. What is implicit here is that every aspect of State behavior can be seen to 
represent international law and that all these expressions of State behavior have binding 
force. From this perspective, international law can be seen as being normatively strong and 
as containing a wide material scope.117 
 
The idealists’ criticism of the other three doctrines is their acceptance of international law’s 
contradictory nature: that the law cannot be concrete and normative at the same time.118 
Each of the three attempts to preserve one part of international law’s nature, while 
downplaying the other. This makes it impossible for lawyers to stay permanently within 
their chosen doctrine.119 A rule- or a policy-approach lawyer would consequently be forced 
towards adapting a more moderate view, unless he became a cynic.120 
 
The idealists believe that a more moderate view would lead these lawyers in the direction 
of idealism, which is, in essence, a variation of the modern program in its original form.121 
Law that exists in and is created by the United Nations is of interest of idealists, especially 
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in areas such as human rights law, economic law and environmental law.122 Idealists 
believe that this has vastly enlarged international law’s material scope.123  
 
A norm’s binding force is assumed to lie implicit in its existence and is therefore not 
questioned.124 This is one reason, making it difficult to analyze an idealist argument. 
Additionally, the lack of “express theorizing” and the serving of “intangible generalities” 
further complicate this.125 Nevertheless, two basic assumptions are believed to give basis 
for an idealist argument: The first being that “law is understood as a reflection of society”, 
and the second being a critical position towards “existing structures of international 
dominance”126. While the first assumption gives reason to the idealists’ view on 
international law’s material scope, the latter gives explanation to the idealists’ attitude and 
their belief in international law’s unquestionable and implicit absolute binding force.127 
 
Consequently, an idealists’ test of law is whether it corresponds with the objectives of the 
international society.128 In other words, it is not a question of whether it can be based on a 
traditional reading of formal sources, but instead a question of whether “it corresponds to 
the nature of present international society and peoples’ cognition of it in their juridical 
conscience.”129 By emphasizing the hypothetical “universal international conscience”130 
instead of the expressed wishes of States, an idealist argument would result in “no 
difference between de lege ferenda and de lege lata in this respect.” 131 Thus, enabling the 
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international lawyer to be released from his dependence on the will of the world’s States, 
and to be able to perceive and apply what is labeled “new” international law.132  
 
From the perspectives of the other doctrines, the idealist position is criticized as utopian 
and for applying natural laws in disguise. The only difference between natural laws and the 
idealists’ “scientific” foundation for its arguments is that the foundation is “verifiable by 
recourse to the actual living conditions, needs and interests of peoples.”133 
3.1.5.2 General traits of an argument from the idealist position/Hypothesis IV 
Hypothesis IV has the following content: 
-The material scope of international law is very wide 
-Law is understood as a reflection of society 
-A rule’s absolute binding force is unquestionable 
-The material law’s content is based on the objectives of peoples and the universal 
international conscience 
-Avoidance of clear theorizing and application of resolving generalities  
 
4 Does one doctrine have dominating influence over the structuring of an 
international humanitarian argument? – An evaluation of hypothesis and 
data 
In this part of the essay, the hypothesis presented in part 3 will be tried against the data 
presented in part 2. I will commence with comparing the general traits of an international 
humanitarian argument as found in the analysis of the Tadic case (data) to the general traits 
of the four modernist doctrines (hypothesis). This will be followed up by an evaluation of 
how the data match the different hypothesis. Finally, a conclusion on whether one of the 
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doctrines has dominating influence over the structuring of an international humanitarian 
argument will be presented. 
4.1 Comparison between the general traits of an international humanitarian 
argument and the general traits of modernist doctrines 
Below, each of the general traits to an international humanitarian argument will be 
compared to the general traits of the four doctrines. This is a comparison between data and 
the four hypotheses. 
4.1.1 The appliance of a wide range of international legal sources 
Implicit in applying a wide range of international legal sources is that it is argued from a 
position that regards international law to have a wide material scope. This perspective 
corresponds to both the policy-approach position and the idealist position, as they both 
perceive international law to have a wide material scope. Hence, this general trait of an 
international humanitarian argument matches a general trait relevant to hypothesis II as 
well as hypothesis IV. 
4.1.2 The appliance of resolving generalities 
By interpreting a written text to have a wide and abstract content, the appliance of 
resolving generalities must be said to be a general trait to an international humanitarian 
argument. This general trait corresponds with that of an argument made from an idealistic 
position. Thus, there is a match with hypothesis IV. 
4.1.3 Avoiding clear theorizing 
Avoiding clear theorizing is an argumentative structure that enables an international lawyer 
to avoid a theoretical discussion with concern to the material question at hand. This general 
traits of an international humanitarian argument is similar to that of an argument made 
from an idealist position.  Once again, a match between data and hypothesis IV is found. 
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4.1.4 Adapting the content of the material law to the opinion of the international 
society 
By adapting the content of the material law to the opinion of the international society, an 
international humanitarian argument can be said to correspond both with general traits of 
the policy-approach position and the idealist position. The focus on observable decision-
making, authority and effectiveness from the rule approach position, could lead an 
international lawyer to adapt the content of the material law to the opinion of the 
international society. Furthermore, this general trait corresponds to the opinion that law is 
understood as a reflection of society, a general trait to an argument made from an idealist 
position. Hence, this matches this general trait to hypotheses II and IV. 
4.1.5 Emphasizing formal legal sources 
Implicit in emphasizing the formal demand to a legal source is that an argument is 
structured after the formal value of a source. This is a general trait of an argument made 
from a rule-approach. A match exists here between the data and hypothesis I. 
4.1.6 Regarding a norm’s absolute binding force as implicit 
Regarding a norm’s absolute binding force as implicit is an argumentative trait that is 
connected to the trait of avoiding clear theorizing. This general trait of an international 
humanitarian argument also corresponds with a general trait to an argument made from an 
idealist position; that a norm’s absolute binding force is unquestionable. This is another 
match between data and hypothesis IV.  
4.2 Evaluation of the hypothesis 
In the comparison between data and hypothesis, matches were found between the general 
traits of an international humanitarian argument and the general traits of arguments made 
from the rule-approach position (hypothesis I), the policy-approach position (hypothesis II) 
and the idealist position (hypothesis IV). No match was found between a typical 
humanitarian argument and the skeptical position (hypothesis III), hence hypothesis III is 
already considered forsaken. 
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4.2.1 Hypothesis I, the rule-approach 
The comparison reveals a 25 per cent match between the general traits of an international 
humanitarian argument and the general traits of a rule-approach argument. The 25 per cent 
similarity is calculated by dividing the amount of common general traits with the total 
number of general traits of a rule-approach argument. In case of the rule-approach, one 
match is found (emphasis on the formality of a legal source). This is one out of four 
possible. A 25 per cent match shows that the rule-approach doctrine has had influence on 
the structuring of an international humanitarian argument.  
 
However, one could argue that the emphasis on a source’s formal validity is different in the 
international humanitarian argument than it would be from a rule-approach position. In an 
international humanitarian argument, the emphasis on a source’s formal validity is 
performed in a superficial manner. By emphasizing sources of minor formal validity in 
interpreting a source of major formal validity, then the formal validity of the main source is 
undermined. In this way, one source’s formal validity is used as a disguise to emphasize 
sources of less formal validity. This illustrates that the 25 per cent match found here is 
relative. 
 
The relativity of the 25 per cent similarity between data and hypothesis I creates doubt 
about the correctness of the finding. However, it does not create doubt about the rule-
approach having some influence on an international humanitarian argument. 
4.2.2 Hypothesis II, the policy-approach 
By sharing two general traits with an international humanitarian argument, the policy-
approach position has a 40 per cent match with an international humanitarian argument. 
The percentage of similarity is calculated in the same way as under 4.2.1.134 This shows 
that the policy-approach position has influence on the structuring of an international 
humanitarian argument. 
 
                                                
134 2/5=0.4. 
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However, both of the common traits can also be said to be traits common to the idealist 
position. This reveals a similarity between the policy-approach and the idealistic position, 
and casts doubt onto whether an international humanitarian argument is influenced by both 
of the doctrines or solely one. As will be shown under 4.2.3, the idealistic position has a 
higher percentage of similarity to an international humanitarian argument than the policy-
approach. This can imply that only the idealist position influence the structuring of an 
international humanitarian argument. 
 
Nevertheless, a 40 per cent match does imply that the policy-approach position may have 
had influence over the structuring of an international humanitarian argument. This means 
that Hypothesis II must be kept, but cannot be considered proven. 
4.2.3 Hypothesis IV, the idealist position 
The comparison shows an 80 per cent match between the general traits of an international 
humanitarian argument and the general traits of an argument made from the idealist 
position. Four out of the five general argumentative traits to an idealist argument are found 
in the general traits of an international humanitarian argument. These numbers show a 
close connection between the idealist position and a typical international humanitarian 
argument.  
 
That the material law’s content is based on the objectives of peoples and the universal 
international conscience, is the only general trait of an idealist position that is not found in 
the data. However, this general trait can be said to lie implicit in the core of international 
humanitarian law. The core of international law is to ensure the well-being of mankind and 
to prosecute severe crimes against mankind. When listing hypothetical common objectives 
of peoples, the well-being of every man would ace that list. Similarly, prosecuting severe 
crimes against mankind can be regarded as based upon a universal international conscience. 
This implies that this general trait could have been found in a more thorough analysis of an 
international humanitarian argument, and that a 100 per cent match might have been found. 
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Nevertheless, the numbers are clear in their verdict and prove what others long have 
assumed135: That the idealist position has dominating influence over the structuring of an 
international humanitarian argument. Hypothesis IV is considered proven.  
4.3 Conclusion 
The idealist doctrine on how to perceive international law has dominating influence over 
the structuring of an international humanitarian argument. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
135 Koskenniemi (2005), p. 210. 
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 A 
6 Appendix 
6.1 Article 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute 
Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal provides: 
 
    "The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or 
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the 
relevant Geneva Convention: 
 
    (a) wilful killing; 
 
    (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments; 
 
    (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; 
 
    (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; 
 
    (e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; 
 
    (f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; 
 
    (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; 
 
    (h) taking civilians as hostages." 
 
 B 
Article 3 of the Statute declares the International Tribunal competent to adjudicate 
violations of the laws or customs of war. The provision states: 
 
    "The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws 
or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to: 
 
    (a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering; 
 
    (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity; 
 
    (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, 
dwellings, or buildings; 
 
    (d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, 
charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and 
science; 
 
    (e) plunder of public or private property." 
6.2 Extracts from Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic 
”C. Grounds Of Appeal 
  
 7. The Appeals Chamber has accordingly heard the parties on all points raised in the 
written pleadings. It has also read the amicus curiae briefs submitted by Juristes sans 
Frontières and the Government of the United States of America, to whom it expresses its 
gratitude. 
  
 C 
 8. Appellant has submitted two successive Briefs in appeal. The second Brief was late but, 
in the absence of any objection by the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber granted the 
extension of time requested by Appellant under Rule 116.  
 The second Brief tends essentially to bolster the arguments developed by Appellant in his 
original Brief. They are offered under the following headings:  
 a) unlawful establishment of the International Tribunal;  
 b) unjustified primacy of the International Tribunal over competent domestic courts;  
 c) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
  
 The Appeals Chamber proposes to examine each of the grounds of appeal in the order in 
which they are raised by Appellant” 
 
 
”IV. LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 
  
 65. Appellant's third ground of appeal is the claim that the International Tribunal lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the crimes alleged. The basis for this allegation is 
Appellant's claim that the subject-matter jurisdiction under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Statute 
of the International Tribunal is limited to crimes committed in the context of an 
international armed conflict. Before the Trial Chamber, Appellant claimed that the alleged 
crimes, even if proven, were committed in the context of an internal armed conflict. On 
appeal an additional alternative claim is asserted to the effect that there was no armed 
conflict at all in the region where the crimes were allegedly committed. 
  
 Before the Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor responded with alternative arguments that: (a) 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia should be characterized as an international armed 
conflict; and (b) even if the conflicts were characterized as internal, the International 
Tribunal has jurisdiction under Articles 3 and 5 to adjudicate the crimes alleged. On appeal, 
the Prosecutor maintains that, upon adoption of the Statute, the Security Council 
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determined that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were international and that, by dint 
of that determination, the International Tribunal has jurisdiction over this case. 
  
 The Trial Chamber denied Appellant's motion, concluding that the notion of international 
armed conflict was not a jurisdictional criterion of Article 2 and that Articles 3 and 5 each 
apply to both internal and international armed conflicts. The Trial Chamber concluded 
therefore that it had jurisdiction, regardless of the nature of the conflict, and that it need not 
determine whether the conflict is internal or international. 
  
 A. Preliminary Issue: The Existence Of An Armed Conflict 
  
 66. Appellant now asserts the new position that there did not exist a legally cognizable 
armed conflict - either internal or international - at the time and place that the alleged 
offences were committed. Appellant's argument is based on a concept of armed conflict 
covering only the precise time and place of actual hostilities. Appellant claims that the 
conflict in the Prijedor region (where the alleged crimes are said to have taken place) was 
limited to a political assumption of power by the Bosnian Serbs and did not involve armed 
combat (though movements of tanks are admitted). This argument presents a preliminary 
issue to which we turn first. 
  
 67. International humanitarian law governs the conduct of both internal and international 
armed conflicts. Appellant correctly points out that for there to be a violation of this body 
of law, there must be an armed conflict. The definition of "armed conflict" varies 
depending on whether the hostilities are international or internal but, contrary to 
Appellant's contention, the temporal and geographical scope of both internal and 
international armed conflicts extends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities. With 
respect to the temporal frame of reference of international armed conflicts, each of the four 
Geneva Conventions contains language intimating that their application may extend 
beyond the cessation of fighting. For example, both Conventions I and III apply until 
protected persons who have fallen into the power of the enemy have been released and 
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repatriated. (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 (hereinafter Geneva 
Convention I); Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949, 
art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. 972 (hereinafter Geneva Convention III); see also Convention relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, art. 6, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 
(hereinafter Geneva Convention IV).) 
  
 68. Although the Geneva Conventions are silent as to the geographical scope of 
international "armed conflicts," the provisions suggest that at least some of the provisions 
of the Conventions apply to the entire territory of the Parties to the conflict, not just to the 
vicinity of actual hostilities. Certainly, some of the provisions are clearly bound up with the 
hostilities and the geographical scope of those provisions should be so limited. Others, 
particularly those relating to the protection of prisoners of war and civilians, are not so 
limited. With respect to prisoners of war, the Convention applies to combatants in the 
power of the enemy; it makes no difference whether they are kept in the vicinity of 
hostilities. In the same vein, Geneva Convention IV protects civilians anywhere in the 
territory of the Parties. This construction is implicit in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 
Convention, which stipulates that:  
 "[i]n the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention shall 
cease on the general close of military operations." (Geneva Convention IV, art. 6, para. 2 
(Emphasis added).)  
  
 Article 3(b) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions contains similar language. (Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, art. 3(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
(hereinafter Protocol I).) In addition to these textual references, the very nature of the 
Conventions - particularly Conventions III and IV - dictates their application throughout 
the territories of the parties to the conflict; any other construction would substantially 
defeat their purpose. 
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 69. The geographical and temporal frame of reference for internal armed conflicts is 
similarly broad. This conception is reflected in the fact that beneficiaries of common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are those taking no active part (or no longer taking 
active part) in the hostilities. This indicates that the rules contained in Article 3 also apply 
outside the narrow geographical context of the actual theatre of combat operations. 
Similarly, certain language in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (a treaty which, as we 
shall see in paragraphs 88 and 114 below, may be regarded as applicable to some aspects of 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia) also suggests a broad scope. First, like common 
Article 3, it explicitly protects "[a]ll persons who do not take a direct part or who have 
ceased to take part in hostilities." (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, 12 December 1977, art. 4, para.1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinafter Protocol II). 
Article 2, paragraph 1, provides:  
 "[t]his Protocol shall be applied [. . . ] to all persons affected by an armed conflict as 
defined in Article 1."(Id. at art. 2, para. 1 (Emphasis added).) 
  
 The same provision specifies in paragraph 2 that: 
  
 "[A]t the end of the conflict, all the persons who have been deprived of their liberty or 
whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to such conflict, as well as those 
deprived of their liberty or whose liberty is restricted after the conflict for the same reasons, 
shall enjoy the protection of Articles 5 and 6 until the end of such deprivation or restriction 
of liberty."(Id. at art. 2, para. 2.) 
  
 Under this last provision, the temporal scope of the applicable rules clearly reaches beyond 
the actual hostilities. Moreover, the relatively loose nature of the language "for reasons 
related to such conflict", suggests a broad geographical scope as well. The nexus required 
is only a relationship between the conflict and the deprivation of liberty, not that the 
deprivation occurred in the midst of battle. 
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 70. On the basis of the foregoing, we find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a 
resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. 
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and 
extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; 
or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, 
international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring 
States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, 
whether or not actual combat takes place there. 
  
 Applying the foregoing concept of armed conflicts to this case, we hold that the alleged 
crimes were committed in the context of an armed conflict. Fighting among the various 
entities within the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, continued through the summer of 
1992 when the alleged crimes are said to have been committed, and persists to this day. 
Notwithstanding various temporary cease-fire agreements, no general conclusion of peace 
has brought military operations in the region to a close. These hostilities exceed the 
intensity requirements applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts. There 
has been protracted, large-scale violence between the armed forces of different States and 
between governmental forces and organized insurgent groups. Even if substantial clashes 
were not occurring in the Prijedor region at the time and place the crimes allegedly were 
committed - a factual issue on which the Appeals Chamber does not pronounce - 
international humanitarian law applies. It is sufficient that the alleged crimes were closely 
related to the hostilities occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to 
the conflict. There is no doubt that the allegations at issue here bear the required 
relationship. The indictment states that in 1992 Bosnian Serbs took control of the Opstina 
of Prijedor and established a prison camp in Omarska. It further alleges that crimes were 
committed against civilians inside and outside the Omarska prison camp as part of the 
Bosnian Serb take-over and consolidation of power in the Prijedor region, which was, in 
turn, part of the larger Bosnian Serb military campaign to obtain control over Bosnian 
territory. Appellant offers no contrary evidence but has admitted in oral argument that in 
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the Prijedor region there were detention camps run not by the central authorities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina but by Bosnian Serbs (Appeal Transcript; 8 September 1995, at 36-7). In light 
of the foregoing, we conclude that, for the purposes of applying international humanitarian 
law, the crimes alleged were committed in the context of an armed conflict. 
  
 B. Does The Statute Refer Only To International Armed Conflicts? 
  
 1. Literal Interpretation Of The Statute 
  
 71. On the face of it, some provisions of the Statute are unclear as to whether they apply to 
offences occurring in international armed conflicts only, or to those perpetrated in internal 
armed conflicts as well. Article 2 refers to "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949, which are widely understood to be committed only in international armed conflicts, 
so the reference in Article 2 would seem to suggest that the Article is limited to 
international armed conflicts. Article 3 also lacks any express reference to the nature of the 
underlying conflict required. A literal reading of this provision standing alone may lead one 
to believe that it applies to both kinds of conflict. By contrast, Article 5 explicitly confers 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in either internal or international armed conflicts. An 
argument a contrario based on the absence of a similar provision in Article 3 might suggest 
that Article 3 applies only to one class of conflict rather than to both of them. In order 
better to ascertain the meaning and scope of these provisions, the Appeals Chamber will 
therefore consider the object and purpose behind the enactment of the Statute. 
  
 2. Teleological Interpretation Of The Statute 
  
 72. In adopting resolution 827, the Security Council established the International Tribunal 
with the stated purpose of bringing to justice persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, thereby deterring future violations 
and contributing to the re-establishment of peace and security in the region. The context in 
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which the Security Council acted indicates that it intended to achieve this purpose without 
reference to whether the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were internal or international. 
  
 As the members of the Security Council well knew, in 1993, when the Statute was drafted, 
the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could have been characterized as both internal and 
international, or alternatively, as an internal conflict alongside an international one, or as an 
internal conflict that had become internationalized because of external support, or as an 
international conflict that had subsequently been replaced by one or more internal conflicts, 
or some combination thereof. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia had been rendered 
international by the involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina and by the 
involvement of the Yugoslav National Army ("JNA") in hostilities in Croatia, as well as in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina at least until its formal withdrawal on 19 May 1992. To the extent that 
the conflicts had been limited to clashes between Bosnian Government forces and Bosnian 
Serb rebel forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as between the Croatian Government and 
Croatian Serb rebel forces in Krajina (Croatia), they had been internal (unless direct 
involvement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) could be proven). 
It is notable that the parties to this case also agree that the conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 have had both internal and international aspects. (See Transcript of 
the Hearing on the Motion on Jurisdiction, 26 July 1995, at 47, 111.) 
  
 73. The varying nature of the conflicts is evidenced by the agreements reached by various 
parties to abide by certain rules of humanitarian law. Reflecting the international aspects of 
the conflicts, on 27 November 1991 representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
the Yugoslavia Peoples' Army, the Republic of Croatia, and the Republic of Serbia entered 
into an agreement on the implementation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 
Additional Protocol I to those Conventions. (See Memorandum of Understanding, 27 
November 1991.) Significantly, the parties refrained from making any mention of common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, concerning non-international armed conflicts. 
  
 J 
 By contrast, an agreement reached on 22 May 1992 between the various factions of the 
conflict within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina reflects the internal aspects of the 
conflicts. The agreement was based on common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
which, in addition to setting forth rules governing internal conflicts, provides in paragraph 
3 that the parties to such conflicts may agree to bring into force provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions that are generally applicable only in international armed conflicts. In the 
Agreement, the representatives of Mr. Alija Izetbegovic (President of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Party of Democratic Action), Mr. Radovan Karadzic 
(President of the Serbian Democratic Party), and Mr. Miljenko Brkic (President of the 
Croatian Democratic Community) committed the parties to abide by the substantive rules 
of internal armed conflict contained in common Article 3 and in addition agreed, on the 
strength of common Article 3, paragraph 3, to apply certain provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions concerning international conflicts. (Agreement No. 1, 22 May 1992, art. 2, 
paras. 1-6 (hereinafter Agreement No. 1).) Clearly, this Agreement shows that the parties 
concerned regarded the armed conflicts in which they were involved as internal but, in 
view of their magnitude, they agreed to extend to them the application of some provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions that are normally applicable in international armed conflicts 
only. The same position was implicitly taken by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross ("ICRC"), at whose invitation and under whose auspices the agreement was reached. 
In this connection it should be noted that, had the ICRC not believed that the conflicts 
governed by the agreement at issue were internal, it would have acted blatantly contrary to 
a common provision of the four Geneva Conventions (Article 6/6/6/7). This is a provision 
formally banning any agreement designed to restrict the application of the Geneva 
Conventions in case of international armed conflicts. ("No special agreement shall 
adversely affect the situation of [the protected persons] as defined by the present 
Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them." (Geneva Convention I, art. 
6; Geneva Convention II, art. 6; Geneva Convention III, art. 6; Geneva Convention IV, art. 
7.) If the conflicts were, in fact, viewed as international, for the ICRC to accept that they 
would be governed only by common Article 3, plus the provisions contained in Article 2, 
paragraphs 1 to 6, of Agreement No. 1, would have constituted clear disregard of the 
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aforementioned Geneva provisions. On account of the unanimously recognized authority, 
competence and impartiality of the ICRC, as well as its statutory mission to promote and 
supervise respect for international humanitarian law, it is inconceivable that, even if there 
were some doubt as to the nature of the conflict, the ICRC would promote and endorse an 
agreement contrary to a basic provision of the Geneva Conventions. The conclusion is 
therefore warranted that the ICRC regarded the conflicts governed by the agreement in 
question as internal. 
  
 Taken together, the agreements reached between the various parties to the conflict(s) in the 
former Yugoslavia bear out the proposition that, when the Security Council adopted the 
Statute of the International Tribunal in 1993, it did so with reference to situations that the 
parties themselves considered at different times and places as either internal or 
international armed conflicts, or as a mixed internal-international conflict. 
  
 74. The Security Council's many statements leading up to the establishment of the 
International Tribunal reflect an awareness of the mixed character of the conflicts. On the 
one hand, prior to creating the International Tribunal, the Security Council adopted several 
resolutions condemning the presence of JNA forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as 
a violation of the sovereignty of these latter States. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 752 (15 May 1992); 
S.C.Res. 757 (30 May 1992); S.C. Res. 779 (6 Oct. 1992); S.C. Res. 787 (16 Nov. 1992). 
On the other hand, in none of these many resolutions did the Security Council explicitly 
state that the conflicts were international. 
  
 In each of its successive resolutions, the Security Council focused on the practices with 
which it was concerned, without reference to the nature of the conflict. For example, in 
resolution 771 of 13 August 1992, the Security Council expressed "grave alarm" at the  
 "[c]ontinuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law occurring 
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
including reports of mass forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and 
abuse of civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, hospitals and 
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ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian population, 
and wanton devastation and destruction of property." (S.C. Res. 771 (13 August 1992).) 
  
 As with every other Security Council statement on the subject, this resolution makes no 
mention of the nature of the armed conflict at issue. The Security Council was clearly 
preoccupied with bringing to justice those responsible for these specifically condemned 
acts, regardless of context. The Prosecutor makes much of the Security Council's repeated 
reference to the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions, which are generally 
deemed applicable only to international armed conflicts. This argument ignores, however, 
that, as often as the Security Council has invoked the grave breaches provisions, it has also 
referred generally to "other violations of international humanitarian law," an expression 
which covers the law applicable in internal armed conflicts as well. 
  
 75. The intent of the Security Council to promote a peaceful solution of the conflict 
without pronouncing upon the question of its international or internal nature is reflected by 
the Report of the Secretary-General of 3 May 1993 and by statements of Security Council 
members regarding their interpretation of the Statute. The Report of the Secretary-General 
explicitly states that the clause of the Statute concerning the temporal jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunal was  
 "clearly intended to convey the notion that no judgement as to the international or internal 
character of the conflict was being exercised." (Report of the Secretary-General, at para. 
62, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (3 May 1993) (hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General).) 
  
 In a similar vein, at the meeting at which the Security Council adopted the Statute, three 
members indicated their understanding that the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal 
under Article 3, with respect to laws or customs of war, included any humanitarian law 
agreement in force in the former Yugoslavia. (See statements by representatives of France, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3217th 
Meeting, at 11, 15, & 19, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (25 May 1993).) As an example of such 
supplementary agreements, the United States cited the rules on internal armed conflict 
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contained in Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as well as "the 1977 Additional Protocols 
to these [Geneva] Conventions [of 1949]." (Id. at 15). This reference clearly embraces 
Additional Protocol II of 1977, relating to internal armed conflict. No other State 
contradicted this interpretation, which clearly reflects an understanding of the conflict as 
both internal and international (it should be emphasized that the United States 
representative, before setting out the American views on the interpretation of the Statute of 
the International Tribunal, pointed out: "[W]e understand that other members of the 
[Security] Council share our view regarding the following clarifications related to the 
Statute."(id.)). 
  
 76. That the Security Council purposely refrained from classifying the armed conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia as either international or internal and, in particular, did not intend to 
bind the International Tribunal by a classification of the conflicts as international, is borne 
out by a reductio ad absurdum argument. If the Security Council had categorized the 
conflict as exclusively international and, in addition, had decided to bind the International 
Tribunal thereby, it would follow that the International Tribunal would have to consider the 
conflict between Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
international. Since it cannot be contended that the Bosnian Serbs constitute a State, 
arguably the classification just referred to would be based on the implicit assumption that 
the Bosnian Serbs are acting not as a rebellious entity but as organs or agents of another 
State, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). As a consequence, serious 
infringements of international humanitarian law committed by the government army of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina against Bosnian Serbian civilians in their power would not be 
regarded as "grave breaches", because such civilians, having the nationality of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, would not be regarded as "protected persons" under Article 4, paragraph 1 of 
Geneva Convention IV. By contrast, atrocities committed by Bosnian Serbs against 
Bosnian civilians in their hands would be regarded as "grave breaches", because such 
civilians would be "protected persons" under the Convention, in that the Bosnian Serbs 
would be acting as organs or agents of another State, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia-Montenegro) of which the Bosnians would not possess the nationality. This would 
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be, of course, an absurd outcome, in that it would place the Bosnian Serbs at a substantial 
legal disadvantage vis-à-vis the central authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This absurdity 
bears out the fallacy of the argument advanced by the Prosecutor before the Appeals 
Chamber. 
  
 77. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia 
have both internal and international aspects, that the members of the Security Council 
clearly had both aspects of the conflicts in mind when they adopted the Statute of the 
International Tribunal, and that they intended to empower the International Tribunal to 
adjudicate violations of humanitarian law that occurred in either context. To the extent 
possible under existing international law, the Statute should therefore be construed to give 
effect to that purpose. 
  
 78. With the exception of Article 5 dealing with crimes against humanity, none of the 
statutory provisions makes explicit reference to the type of conflict as an element of the 
crime; and, as will be shown below, the reference in Article 5 is made to distinguish the 
nexus required by the Statute from the nexus required by Article 6 of the London 
Agreement of 8 August 1945 establishing the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg. Since customary international law no longer requires any nexus between 
crimes against humanity and armed conflict (see below, paras. 140 and 141), Article 5 was 
intended to reintroduce this nexus for the purposes of this Tribunal. As previously noted, 
although Article 2 does not explicitly refer to the nature of the conflicts, its reference to the 
grave breaches provisions suggest that it is limited to international armed conflicts. It 
would however defeat the Security Council's purpose to read a similar international armed 
conflict requirement into the remaining jurisdictional provisions of the Statute. Contrary to 
the drafters' apparent indifference to the nature of the underlying conflicts, such an 
interpretation would authorize the International Tribunal to prosecute and punish certain 
conduct in an international armed conflict, while turning a blind eye to the very same 
conduct in an internal armed conflict. To illustrate, the Security Council has repeatedly 
condemned the wanton devastation and destruction of property, which is explicitly 
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punishable only under Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute. Appellant maintains that these 
Articles apply only to international armed conflicts. However, it would have been illogical 
for the drafters of the Statute to confer on the International Tribunal the competence to 
adjudicate the very conduct about which they were concerned, only in the event that the 
context was an international conflict, when they knew that the conflicts at issue in the 
former Yugoslavia could have been classified, at varying times and places, as internal, 
international, or both.  
  
 Thus, the Security Council's object in enacting the Statute - to prosecute and punish 
persons responsible for certain condemned acts being committed in a conflict understood to 
contain both internal and international aspects - suggests that the Security Council intended 
that, to the extent possible, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Tribunal 
should extend to both internal and international armed conflicts. 
  
 In light of this understanding of the Security Council's purpose in creating the International 
Tribunal, we turn below to discussion of Appellant's specific arguments regarding the 
scope of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal under Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the 
Statute. 
  
 3. Logical And Systematic Interpretation Of The Statute 
  
 (a) Article 2 
  
 79. Article 2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal provides:  
 "The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or 
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the 
relevant Geneva Convention:  
  
 (a) wilful killing;  
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 (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;  
  
 (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;  
  
 (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;  
  
 (e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power;  
  
 (f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial;  
  
 (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;  
  
 (h) taking civilians as hostages." 
  
 By its explicit terms, and as confirmed in the Report of the Secretary-General, this Article 
of the Statute is based on the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, more specifically, the 
provisions of those Conventions relating to "grave breaches" of the Conventions. Each of 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contains a "grave breaches" provision, specifying 
particular breaches of the Convention for which the High Contracting Parties have a duty to 
prosecute those responsible. In other words, for these specific acts, the Conventions create 
universal mandatory criminal jurisdiction among contracting States. Although the language 
of the Conventions might appear to be ambiguous and the question is open to some debate 
(see, e.g.,[Amicus Curiae] Submission of the Government of the United States of America 
Concerning Certain Arguments Made by Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Dusan Tadic, 17 July 1995, (Case No. IT-94-1-T), at 35-6 
(hereinafter, U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief), it is widely contended that the grave breaches 
provisions establish universal mandatory jurisdiction only with respect to those breaches of 
the Conventions committed in international armed conflicts. Appellant argues that, as the 
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grave breaches enforcement system only applies to international armed conflicts, reference 
in Article 2 of the Statute to the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
limits the International Tribunal's jurisdiction under that Article to acts committed in the 
context of an international armed conflict. The Trial Chamber has held that Article 2:  
 "[H]as been so drafted as to be self-contained rather than referential, save for the 
identification of the victims of enumerated acts; that identification and that alone involves 
going to the Conventions themselves for the definition of 'persons or property protected'." 
  
 [. . . ] 
  
 [T]he requirement of international conflict does not appear on the face of Article 2. 
Certainly, nothing in the words of the Article expressly require its existence; once one of 
the specified acts is allegedly committed upon a protected person the power of the 
International Tribunal to prosecute arises if the spatial and temporal requirements of Article 
1 are met. 
  
 [. . . ]  
  
 [T]here is no ground for treating Article 2 as in effect importing into the Statute the whole 
of the terms of the Conventions, including the reference in common Article 2 of the 
Geneva Convention [sic] to international conflicts. As stated, Article 2 of the Statute is on 
its face, self-contained, save in relation to the definition of protected persons and things." 
(Decision at Trial, at paras. 49-51.) 
  
 80. With all due respect, the Trial Chamber's reasoning is based on a misconception of the 
grave breaches provisions and the extent of their incorporation into the Statute of the 
International Tribunal. The grave breaches system of the Geneva Conventions establishes a 
twofold system: there is on the one hand an enumeration of offences that are regarded so 
serious as to constitute "grave breaches"; closely bound up with this enumeration a 
mandatory enforcement mechanism is set up, based on the concept of a duty and a right of 
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all Contracting States to search for and try or extradite persons allegedly responsible for 
"grave breaches." The international armed conflict element generally attributed to the grave 
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions is merely a function of the system of 
universal mandatory jurisdiction that those provisions create. The international armed 
conflict requirement was a necessary limitation on the grave breaches system in light of the 
intrusion on State sovereignty that such mandatory universal jurisdiction represents. State 
parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not want to give other States jurisdiction over 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in their internal armed 
conflicts - at least not the mandatory universal jurisdiction involved in the grave breaches 
system.  
  
 81. The Trial Chamber is right in implying that the enforcement mechanism has of course 
not been imported into the Statute of the International Tribunal, for the obvious reason that 
the International Tribunal itself constitutes a mechanism for the prosecution and 
punishment of the perpetrators of "grave breaches." However, the Trial Chamber has 
misinterpreted the reference to the Geneva Conventions contained in the sentence of 
Article 2: "persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva 
Conventions." (Statute of the Tribunal, art. 2.) For the reasons set out above, this reference 
is clearly intended to indicate that the offences listed under Article 2 can only be 
prosecuted when perpetrated against persons or property regarded as "protected" by the 
Geneva Conventions under the strict conditions set out by the Conventions themselves. 
This reference in Article 2 to the notion of "protected persons or property" must perforce 
cover the persons mentioned in Articles 13, 24, 25 and 26 (protected persons) and 19 and 
33 to 35 (protected objects) of Geneva Convention I; in Articles 13, 36, 37 (protected 
persons) and 22, 24, 25 and 27 (protected objects) of Convention II; in Article 4 of 
Convention III on prisoners of war; and in Articles 4 and 20 (protected persons) and 
Articles 18, 19, 21, 22, 33, 53, 57 etc. (protected property) of Convention IV on civilians. 
Clearly, these provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to persons or objects protected 
only to the extent that they are caught up in an international armed conflict. By contrast, 
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those provisions do not include persons or property coming within the purview of common 
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions. 
  
 82. The above interpretation is borne out by what could be considered as part of the 
preparatory works of the Statute of the International Tribunal, namely the Report of the 
Secretary-General. There, in introducing and explaining the meaning and purport of Article 
2 and having regard to the "grave breaches" system of the Geneva Conventions, reference 
is made to "international armed conflicts" (Report of the Secretary-General at para. 37). 
  
 83. We find that our interpretation of Article 2 is the only one warranted by the text of the 
Statute and the relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions, as well as by a logical 
construction of their interplay as dictated by Article 2. However, we are aware that this 
conclusion may appear not to be consonant with recent trends of both State practice and the 
whole doctrine of human rights - which, as pointed out below (see paras. 97-127), tend to 
blur in many respects the traditional dichotomy between international wars and civil strife. 
In this connection the Chamber notes with satisfaction the statement in the amicus curiae 
brief submitted by the Government of the United States, where it is contended that:  
 "the 'grave breaches' provisions of Article 2 of the International Tribunal Statute apply to 
armed conflicts of a non-international character as well as those of an international 
character." (U.S. Amicus Curiae Brief, at 35.)  
  
 This statement, unsupported by any authority, does not seem to be warranted as to the 
interpretation of Article 2 of the Statute. Nevertheless, seen from another viewpoint, there 
is no gainsaying its significance: that statement articulates the legal views of one of the 
permanent members of the Security Council on a delicate legal issue; on this score it 
provides the first indication of a possible change in opinio juris of States. Were other States 
and international bodies to come to share this view, a change in customary law concerning 
the scope of the "grave breaches" system might gradually materialize. Other elements 
pointing in the same direction can be found in the provision of the German Military Manual 
mentioned below (para. 131), whereby grave breaches of international humanitarian law 
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include some violations of common Article 3. In addition, attention can be drawn to the 
Agreement of 1 October 1992 entered into by the conflicting parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Articles 3 and 4 of this Agreement implicitly provide for the prosecution and 
punishment of those responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I. As the Agreement was clearly concluded within a framework of an 
internal armed conflict (see above, para. 73), it may be taken as an important indication of 
the present trend to extend the grave breaches provisions to such category of conflicts. One 
can also mention a recent judgement by a Danish court. On 25 November 1994 the Third 
Chamber of the Eastern Division of the Danish High Court delivered a judgement on a 
person accused of crimes committed together with a number of Croatian military police on 
5 August 1993 in the Croatian prison camp of Dretelj in Bosnia (The Prosecution v. Refik 
Saric, unpublished (Den.H. Ct. 1994)). The Court explicitly acted on the basis of the "grave 
breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions, more specifically Articles 129 and 130 of 
Convention III and Articles 146 and 147 of Convention IV (The Prosecution v. Refik Saric, 
Transcript, at 1 (25 Nov. 1994)), without however raising the preliminary question of 
whether the alleged offences had occurred within the framework of an international rather 
than an internal armed conflict (in the event the Court convicted the accused on the basis of 
those provisions and the relevant penal provisions of the Danish Penal Code, (see id. at 7-
8)). This judgement indicates that some national courts are also taking the view that the 
"grave breaches" system may operate regardless of whether the armed conflict is 
international or internal.  
  
 84. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Appeals Chamber must conclude that, in the 
present state of development of the law, Article 2 of the Statute only applies to offences 
committed within the context of international armed conflicts. 
  
 85. Before the Trial Chamber, the Prosecutor asserted an alternative argument whereby the 
provisions on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions could be applied to internal 
conflicts on the strength of some agreements entered into by the conflicting parties. For the 
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reasons stated below, in Section IV C (para. 144), we find it unnecessary to resolve this 
issue at this time. 
  
 (b) Article 3 
  
 86. Article 3 of the Statute declares the International Tribunal competent to adjudicate 
violations of the laws or customs of war. The provision states:  
 "The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or 
customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to: 
  
 (a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary 
suffering;  
  
 (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity; 
  
 (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, 
or buildings;  
  
 (d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, 
charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and 
science;  
  
 (e) plunder of public or private property." 
  
 As explained by the Secretary-General in his Report on the Statute, this provision is based 
on the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
the Regulations annexed to that Convention, and the Nuremberg Tribunal's interpretation of 
those Regulations. Appellant argues that the Hague Regulations were adopted to regulate 
interstate armed conflict, while the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is in casu an internal 
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armed conflict; therefore, to the extent that the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal 
under Article 3 is based on the Hague Regulations, it lacks jurisdiction under Article 3 to 
adjudicate alleged violations in the former Yugoslavia. Appellant's argument does not bear 
close scrutiny, for it is based on an unnecessarily narrow reading of the Statute. 
  
 (i) The Interpretation of Article 3 
  
 87. A literal interpretation of Article 3 shows that: (i) it refers to a broad category of 
offences, namely all "violations of the laws or customs of war"; and (ii) the enumeration of 
some of these violations provided in Article 3 is merely illustrative, not exhaustive. 
  
 To identify the content of the class of offences falling under Article 3, attention should be 
drawn to an important fact. The expression "violations of the laws or customs of war" is a 
traditional term of art used in the past, when the concepts of "war" and "laws of warfare" 
still prevailed, before they were largely replaced by two broader notions: (i) that of "armed 
conflict", essentially introduced by the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and (ii) the correlative 
notion of "international law of armed conflict", or the more recent and comprehensive 
notion of "international humanitarian law", which has emerged as a result of the influence 
of human rights doctrines on the law of armed conflict. As stated above, it is clear from the 
Report of the Secretary-General that the old-fashioned expression referred to above was 
used in Article 3 of the Statute primarily to make reference to the 1907 Hague Convention 
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed 
thereto (Report of the Secretary-General, at para. 41). However, as the Report indicates, the 
Hague Convention, considered qua customary law, constitutes an important area of 
humanitarian international law. (Id.) In other words, the Secretary-General himself 
concedes that the traditional laws of warfare are now more correctly termed "international 
humanitarian law" and that the so-called "Hague Regulations" constitute an important 
segment of such law. Furthermore, the Secretary-General has also correctly admitted that 
the Hague Regulations have a broader scope than the Geneva Conventions, in that they 
cover not only the protection of victims of armed violence (civilians) or of those who no 
 W 
longer take part in hostilities (prisoners of war), the wounded and the sick) but also the 
conduct of hostilities; in the words of the Report: "The Hague Regulations cover aspects of 
international humanitarian law which are also covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions." 
(Id., at para. 43.) These comments suggest that Article 3 is intended to cover both Geneva 
and Hague rules law. On the other hand, the Secretary-General's subsequent comments 
indicate that the violations explicitly listed in Article 3 relate to Hague law not contained in 
the Geneva Conventions (id., at paras. 43-4). As pointed out above, this list is, however, 
merely illustrative: indeed, Article 3, before enumerating the violations provides that they 
"shall include but not be limited to" the list of offences. Considering this list in the general 
context of the Secretary-General's discussion of the Hague Regulations and international 
humanitarian law, we conclude that this list may be construed to include other 
infringements of international humanitarian law. The only limitation is that such 
infringements must not be already covered by Article 2 (lest this latter provision should 
become superfluous). Article 3 may be taken to cover all violations of international 
humanitarian law other than the "grave breaches" of the four Geneva Conventions falling 
under Article 2 (or, for that matter, the violations covered by Articles 4 and 5, to the extent 
that Articles 3, 4 and 5 overlap). 
  
 88. That Article 3 does not confine itself to covering violations of Hague law, but is 
intended also to refer to all violations of international humanitarian law (subject to the 
limitations just stated), is borne out by the debates in the Security Council that followed the 
adoption of the resolution establishing the International Tribunal. As mentioned above, 
three Member States of the Council, namely France, the United States and the United 
Kingdom, expressly stated that Article 3 of the Statute also covers obligations stemming 
from agreements in force between the conflicting parties, that is Article 3 common to the 
Geneva Conventions and the two Additional Protocols, as well as other agreements entered 
into by the conflicting parties. The French delegate stated that:  
 "[T]he expression 'laws or customs of war' used in Article 3 of the Statute covers 
specifically, in the opinion of France, all the obligations that flow from the humanitarian 
law agreements in force on the territory of the former Yugoslavia at the time when the 
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offences were committed." (Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3217th Meeting, at 11, 
U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (25 May 1993).) 
  
 The American delegate stated the following:  
 "[W]e understand that other members of the Council share our view regarding the 
following clarifications related to the Statute: 
  
 Firstly, it is understood that the 'laws or customs of war' referred to in Article 3 include all 
obligations under humanitarian law agreements in force in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia at the time the acts were committed, including common article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Additional Protocols to these Conventions." (Id., at p. 
15.) 
  
 The British delegate stated:  
 "[I]t would be our view that the reference to the laws or customs of war in Article 3 is 
broad enough to include applicable international conventions." (Id., at p. 19.) 
  
 It should be added that the representative of Hungary stressed:  
 "the importance of the fact that the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal covers the 
whole range of international humanitarian law and the entire duration of the conflict 
throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia." (Id., at p. 20.)  
  
 Since no delegate contested these declarations, they can be regarded as providing an 
authoritative interpretation of Article 3 to the effect that its scope is much broader than the 
enumerated violations of Hague law.  
  
 89. In light of the above remarks, it can be held that Article 3 is a general clause covering 
all violations of humanitarian law not falling under Article 2 or covered by Articles 4 or 5, 
more specifically: (i) violations of the Hague law on international conflicts; (ii) 
infringements of provisions of the Geneva Conventions other than those classified as 
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"grave breaches" by those Conventions; (iii) violations of common Article 3 and other 
customary rules on internal conflicts; (iv) violations of agreements binding upon the parties 
to the conflict, considered qua treaty law, i.e., agreements which have not turned into 
customary international law (on this point see below, para. 143). 
  
 90. The Appeals Chamber would like to add that, in interpreting the meaning and purport 
of the expressions "violations of the laws or customs of war" or "violations of international 
humanitarian law", one must take account of the context of the Statute as a whole. A 
systematic construction of the Statute emphasises the fact that various provisions, in 
spelling out the purpose and tasks of the International Tribunal or in defining its functions, 
refer to "serious violations" of international humanitarian law" (See Statute of the 
International Tribunal, Preamble, arts. 1, 9(1), 10(1)-(2), 23(1), 29(1) (Emphasis added.)). 
It is therefore appropriate to take the expression "violations of the laws or customs of war" 
to cover serious violations of international humanitarian law. 
  
 91. Article 3 thus confers on the International Tribunal jurisdiction over any serious 
offence against international humanitarian law not covered by Article 2, 4 or 5. Article 3 is 
a fundamental provision laying down that any "serious violation of international 
humanitarian law" must be prosecuted by the International Tribunal. In other words, Article 
3 functions as a residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of international 
humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. Article 
3 aims to make such jurisdiction watertight and inescapable. 
  
 92. This construction of Article 3 is also corroborated by the object and purpose of the 
provision. When it decided to establish the International Tribunal, the Security Council did 
so to put a stop to all serious violations of international humanitarian law occurring in the 
former Yugoslavia and not only special classes of them, namely "grave breaches" of the 
Geneva Conventions or violations of the "Hague law." Thus, if correctly interpreted, 
Article 3 fully realizes the primary purpose of the establishment of the International 
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Tribunal, that is, not to leave unpunished any person guilty of any such serious violation, 
whatever the context within which it may have been committed.  
  
 93. The above interpretation is further confirmed if Article 3 is viewed in its more general 
perspective, that is to say, is appraised in its historical context. As the International Court 
of Justice stated in the Nicaragua case, Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions, whereby 
the contracting parties "undertake to respect and ensure respect" for the Conventions "in all 
circumstances", has become a "general principle [. . .] of humanitarian law to which the 
Conventions merely give specific expression." (Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. Reports 14, at 
para. 220 (27 June) (hereinafter Nicaragua Case). This general principle lays down an 
obligation that is incumbent, not only on States, but also on other international entities 
including the United Nations. It was with this obligation in mind that, in 1977, the States 
drafting the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions agreed upon Article 89 of 
Protocol I, whereby:  
 "In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High 
Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United 
Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter." (Protocol I, at art. 89 
(Emphasis added).) 
  
 Article 3 is intended to realise that undertaking by endowing the International Tribunal 
with the power to prosecute all "serious violations" of international humanitarian law.” 
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